- Collin Mulliner (Researcher, Systems Security Lab, Northeastern University)
- Corey Kallenberg (Security Researcher, The MITRE Corporation)
- Job de Haas (Senior Specialist, Riscure)
- John Butterworth (Security Researcher, The MITRE Corporation)
- Joshua "@p0sixninja" Hill (Independent Security Researcher)
- Joaquim Espinhara (Security Consultant, Trustwave)
- Luiz Eduardo (Director, Trustwave Spiderlabs)
- Dr. Marco Balduzzi (Senior Researcher, Trend Micro)
- Mark Vincent Yason (Security Researcher, IBM X-Force)
- Mathias Morbitzer (Masters Student, Radboud University Nijmegen)
- Peter "@bl4sty" Geissler (Independent Security Researcher)
- Stefan Esser (Head of R&D, SektionEins GmbH)
- Vladimir Katalov (Co-Founder, ElcomSoft)
- Xeno Kovah (Lead Infosec Engineer, The MITRE Corporation)
Hey Captain, Where's Your Ship? Attacking Vessel Tracking Systems for Fun and Profit
In recent years, automated identification systems (AISes) have been introduced to enhance vessels tracking and provide extra safety to marine traffic, on top of conventional radar installations. AIS, which is currently a mandatory installation for all passenger ships and ships over 300 metric tonnes, works by acquiring GPS coordinates and exchanging vesselís position, course and information with nearby ships, offshore installation, i.e. harbors and traffic controls, and Internet tracking and visualizing providers.
In this talk, we share with you our finding, i.e how we have able to hijack and perform man-in-the-middle attacks on existing vessels, take over AIS communications, tamper with the major online tracking providers and eventually fake our own yacht!.
Demystifying Game Console Security: Over 10 Years of Ownage Unraveled
Are you interested to learn about the delicate hacks and tricks that go on behind the curtains of the scene better known as ďthe console hacking sceneĒ? Are you eager to find out who/what is behind all this incredible work that allows your little Nephew to play a copy of Call of Duty on his XBOX? Then this talk is for you!
Defeating Signed BIOS Enforcement
In this secure BIOS update scheme, there are two primary attack surfaces that can be targeted in an attempt to break the signed BIOS requirement: the Intel architecture protection mechanisms, and the vendorís implementation of the signature enforcement and update routine.
This presentation demonstrates two attacks; one against each of these targets. Both of these attacks allow an attacker to arbitrarily re-flash the BIOS on a number of systems despite the presence of signed BIOS enforcement.