And, in the face of the huge number of responses resulting from a DDoS attack, itís worth considering overproviding existing infrastructure, a process that is both inexpensive and easy to trial prior to an incident.
Cloud-based DNS providers run name servers of their own in data centers around the world. These can be configured as secondaries for an organizationís own, with data loaded from a master name server designated and managed in-house. Itís worth noting, though, that most of these providers bill for the number of queries received, which will of course increase significantly during a DNS attack.
As well as configuring their DNS infrastructures to resist DDoS attacks, organizations should also ensure they donít become unwitting accomplices in DDoS attacks against others.
Unless the company is one of the very few that runs an open recursive name server, it can limit DNS queries to those IP addresses on its internal networks, thereby making sure that only authorized users have access to its recursive name servers.
And for those that run authoritative name servers, Response Rate Limiting (RRL), incorporated into BIND name servers, makes it difficult for attackers to amplify queries, stopping responses being sent to a single IP address at any rate higher than a pre-programmed threshold.
By understanding how DDoS attacks exploit DNS servers, and recognizing the signs, organizations can take measures to lower the threat on their own infrastructure, and avoid becoming complicit in attacks on others.