-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CERT Advisory CA-2003-04 MS-SQL Server Worm Original release date: January 25, 2003 Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file. Systems Affected * Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Overview The CERT/CC has received reports of self-propagating malicious code that exploits multiple vulnerabilities in the Resolution Service of Microsoft SQL Server 2000. The propagation of this worm has caused varied levels of network degradation across the Internet, in addition to the compromise of vulnerable machines I. Description The worm targeting SQL Server computers is self-propagating malicious code that most likely exploits two vulnerabilities in the Resolution Service of Microsoft SQL Server 2000 vulnerabilities. The vulnerability documented in VU#370308 allows the keep-alive functionality employed by the SQL Server Resolution Service to launch a denial of service against other hosts. Either the vulnerability VU#399260 or VU#484891 allow for the execution of arbitrary code on the SQL Server computer due to a buffer overflow. VU#370308 - http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/370308 VU#399260 - http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/399260 VU#484891 - http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/484891 Reports to the CERT/CC indicate that the high volume of 1434/udp traffic generated between hosts infected with the worm targeting SQL Server computers may itself lead to performance issues (including possible denial-of-service conditions) on networks with infected hosts. Activity of this worm is readily identifiable on a network by the presence of small UDP packets (we have received reports of 376-410 byte packets) from seemingly random IP addresses from across the Internet to port 1434/udp. II. Impact Compromise by the worm indicates that a remote attacker can execute arbitrary code as the local SYSTEM user on the victim system. It may be possible for an attacker to subsequently leverage a local privilege escalation exploit in order to gain Administrator access to the victim system. The high volume of 1434/udp traffic generated between hosts infected with the worm may itself lead to performance issues on networks with both infected and targeted, but non-vulnerable hosts. III. Solution Apply a patch Administrators of all systems running Microsoft SQL Server 2000 are encouraged to review CA-2002-22 and VU#370308 for detailed vendor recommendations regarding installing the patch: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/ MS02-039.asp CA-2002-22 - http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-22.html VU#370308 - http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/370308 Ingress/Egress filtering The following steps are only effective in limiting the damage that can be done by systems already infected with the worm. They provide no protection whatsoever against the initial infection of systems. As a result, these steps are only recommended in addition to the preventative steps outlined above, not in lieu thereof. Ingress filtering manages the flow of traffic as it enters a network under your administrative control. Servers are typically the only machines that need to accept inbound traffic from the public Internet. In the network usage policy of many sites, external hosts are only permitted to initiate inbound traffic to machines that provide public services on specific ports. Thus, ingress filtering should be performed at the border to prohibit externally initiated inbound traffic to non-authorized services. Egress filtering manages the flow of traffic as it leaves a network under your administrative control. There is typically limited need for machines providing public services to initiate outbound connections to the Internet. In the case of this worm, employing ingress and egress filtering can help prevent compromised systems on your network from attacking systems elsewhere. Blocking UDP datagrams with both source and destination ports 1434 from entering or leaving your network reduces the risk of external infected systems communicating with infected hosts inside your network. Recovering from a system compromise If you believe a system under your administrative control has been compromised, please follow the steps outlined in: Steps for Recovering from a UNIX or NT System Compromise http://www.cert.org/tech_tips/win-UNIX-system_compromise.html Reporting The CERT/CC is interested in receiving reports of this activity. If machines under your administrative control are compromised, please send mail to firstname.lastname@example.org with the following text included in the subject line: "[CERT#35663]". _________________________________________________________________ Feedback can be directed to the author: Roman Danyliw ______________________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-04.html ______________________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: email@example.com Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT/CC personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. ______________________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. _________________________________________________________________ Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2003 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History January 25, 2003: Initial release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 6.5.8 iQCVAwUBPjKkJmjtSoHZUTs5AQG4KgP+MGcnpMxQrAVMBu+jhPhIobYp2eaPRSfx Nj5TQs9A3749p11Of1h5KxyqrjBhL/Ff8jyac4Vj0XWa4KtYeiPbC0feN49LKEnn 6JLf24Pyov3wEPn9tcBJ511lAhD506sUVsTTrexrFUgaSCFnG4nucP1wC93JUbdx QxMA0Aixt1U= =VhD+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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