-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- NetBSD Security Advisory 2002-012 ================================= Topic: buffer overrun in setlocale Severity: local root exploit if X11 (xterm) is installed. Version: NetBSD-current: source prior to August 8, 2002 NetBSD-1.6 beta:source prior to August 8, 2002 NetBSD-1.5.3: affected NetBSD-1.5.2: affected NetBSD-1.5.1: affected NetBSD-1.5: affected NetBSD-1.4.*: affected All prior NetBSD releases. Fixed: NetBSD-current: August 8, 2002 NetBSD-1.6 branch: August 8, 2002 (1.6 includes the fix) NetBSD-1.5 branch: September 5, 2002 NetBSD-1.4 branch: not yet Abstract ======== There was a boundary checking bug of array suffix in setlocale() function in libc. If the setlocale() function is used with arguments satisfying a specific condition (see below), there is a possibility that this could be exploitable. This condition is as the following: 1. setlocale() function is called for LC_ALL category and 2. The string pointed to by the second argument of setlocale contains over six elements separated by slash. An example of string causing this problem to setlocale() is "C/C/C/C/C/C/C". (note that the frequently used special form, setlocale(LC_ALL, ""), does not cause this problem, since the code having this problem is never executed in this case.) 3. To use this bug to exploit, the second argument of setlocale needs to be derived from user-given data (e.g. environment variables or command line arguments) and the program need to be setuid or need to be involved in some setuid program or daemon. Most programs using Xt, including xterm (setuid program), may satisfy this condition. All other programs in NetBSD distribution except for packages do not satisfy it. In packages, zsh is one of the most important program that may satisfy this condition. Technical Details ================= The setlocale (or its subcontractor, __setlocale) function, defined in lib/libc/locale/setlocale.c, is used to change the locale of each locale category. setlocale() function switches the locale of the category specified by the first argument to the second argument. The special category LC_ALL can be used to change all locale categories at the same time. In this case, the NetBSD implementation of setlocale allows a special form of the second argument string to specify individual locales per category. In this form, each locale is given in a single string separated by slashes ('/'), as "A/B/C/D/E/F". Here, each element corresponds to categories LC_COLLATE, LC_CTYPE, LC_MONETARY, LC_NUMERIC, LC_TIME and LC_MESSAGES, respectively. The setlocale() function attempts to decomposit these elements into an array object named new_categories locally defined in lib/libc/locale/setlocale.c. However, the code to check the array boundary was lacking and thus this decomposition code could destroy data segment if a string having over six elements was given. If the program which has set[ug]id bit or which is called from set[ug]id program calls setlocale() with LC_ALL as the first argument and with the string derived from user-given data (e.g. setlocale(LC_ALL, getenv("FOO")) ) as the second argument, then such program could be exploitable. DefaultLanguageProc function of X Toolkit Intrinsics (Xt) is a example of such usage. DefaultLanguageProc calls setlocale as "setlocale(LC_ALL, xnl)". Here, xnl variable is null string ("") by default, but can be overriden by user via - -xnllanguage option. Most Xt programs, including xterm, use this language procedure. xterm is a setuid root program and thus any local user could illegally acquire root account by using this problem. On the other hand, the frequently used special form, setlocale(LC_ALL, ""), does not have this problem because the decomposition code is never executed in this form, although user-given LC_ALL environment variable is similarly referred. Solutions and Workarounds ========================= The recent NetBSD 1.6 release is not vulnerable to this issue. A full upgrade to NetBSD 1.6 is the recommended resolution for all users able to do so. Many security-related improvements have been made, and indeed this release has been delayed several times in order to include fixes for a number of recent issues. Otherwise, you must update libc. Also, you must update all statically linked binaries satisfying the condition above - although the NetBSD distribution contains no such static binaries, you may have some from pkgsrc packages or local programs. The following instructions describe how to update libc. * NetBSD-current: Systems running NetBSD-current dated from before 2002-08-08 should be upgraded to NetBSD-current dated 2002-08-08 or later. The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-current CVS branch (aka HEAD): lib/libc/locale To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc: # cd src # cvs update -d -P lib/libc/locale # cd lib/libc # make cleandir dependall # make install * NetBSD 1.6 betas: Systems running NetBSD 1.6 BETAs and Release Candidates should be upgraded to the NetBSD 1.6 release. If a source-based point upgrade is required, sources from the NetBSD 1.6 branch dated 2002-08-08 or later should be used. The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-1-6 CVS branch: lib/libc/locale To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc: # cd src # cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-6 lib/libc/locale # cd lib/libc # make cleandir dependall # make install * NetBSD 1.5.x: Systems running NetBSD 1.5 betas dated from before 2002-09-05 should be upgraded to NetBSD 1.5 tree dated 2002-09-05 or later. The following directories need to be updated from the netbsd-1-5 CVS branch: lib/libc/locale To update from CVS, re-build, and re-install libc: # cd src # cvs update -d -P -r netbsd-1-5 lib/libc/locale # cd lib/libc # make cleandir dependall # make install * NetBSD 1.4.x: not yet Thanks To ========= Andrey A. Chernov for initial fix in FreeBSD source. Takuya SHIOZAKI for preparing the initial advisory text. The NetBSD Release Engineering teams, for great patience and assistance in dealing with repeated security issues discovered recently. Revision History ================ 2002-09-16 Initial release More Information ================ An up-to-date PGP signed copy of this release will be maintained at ftp://ftp.netbsd.org/pub/NetBSD/security/advisories/NetBSD-SA2002-012.txt.asc Information about NetBSD and NetBSD security can be found at http://www.NetBSD.ORG/ and http://www.NetBSD.ORG/Security/. Copyright 2002, The NetBSD Foundation, Inc. All Rights Reserved. $NetBSD: NetBSD-SA2002-012.txt,v 1.11 2002/09/16 05:17:55 dan Exp $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBPYVqPT5Ru2/4N2IFAQF2ngP9Gy/ZVH4yizEHSiv8f1OLHxn2auf3J/bx Tit7KQVGiCQS/1sZ2UxV8ZVKQOzJwrJNHuJ23YS2iDs//RxghmpjVGQPmS91t7vb X3z7SEy3mgEe0VClcDMSamxiomPi8rcH37CdlflHkTneX/UYsPgLClGT55PXtOu9 ZfqrAQGUgeU= =5MrG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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